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GENERATION-SKIPPING

TAX

becoming generation-skipping trust equivalents, the first level might be combined with the second and applied in such a manner that those costs would be
spread over all policies that actually become trust equivalents through a reduction in benefits at the time of the election of an option creating a trust
equivalent. As to the third and fourth levels of cost, it seems only appropriate
that these burdens should be borne by the respective policies involved.
It is clear that future policy language needs to be amended as quickly as
possible to accommodate the new generation-skipping law. As to those policies
in existence, it is hoped that both the legislators and the courts will assist in
achieving equity after this addition to existing responsibilities. It is not inconceivable that companies and beneficiaries will need assistance in applying
the legal interpretations to the peculiar insurance situation, in figuring out
from where the tax is to be paid, and in allocating the cost of the administrative burdens.
The problems in administration of the generation-skipping tax as applied
to insurance proceeds are indeed overwhelming. Congressional reports and hearings do not indicate any serious thought or discussion of these problems. This
paper has certainly not answered all of the issues that might arise. Instead, an
attempt has been made to point out a few of the problems and some possible
solutions. The reader will undoubtedly be able to think of many additional
items that will cause concern in the area of trust equivalent applications.
CAROL A. HAnTEy

ENFORCEABILITY OF COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS TO
ARBITRATE FUTURE DISPUTES:
JUDICIAL ALTERATION OF THE
FLORIDA ARBITRATION CODE
INTRODUCTION

Commercial arbitration is a process by which parties, pursuant to an agreement, submit disputes arising between them to impartial third parties for
resolution.1 The process has been praised as a desirable alternative to litigation, 2 and the submission of existing controversies to arbitration has a long
history of legislative approval. However, clauses in contracts calling for the
arbitration of future disputes arising out of the subject matter of those con197.

See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.

1. M. DoMKE, COMMERCiAL ARrrBATON, §§1.01-.02, at 1-5 (1968 & Supp. 1977).
2. Gotshal, Arbitration and the Lawyer's Place in the Business Community, 11:3 TBE
BusmNss LAWYER 52 (1956). The author notes that arbitration affords speed, justice, economy
and privacy. Id. at 55.
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tracts traditionally were held unenforceable at common law3 because of what
the courts perceived as improper attempts to oust them of their natural jurisdiction.4 This traditional disfavor of the latter type of arbitration agreement
has been eroded gradually in the twentieth century by statutory enactments
and by an increasingly favorable attitude among American courts toward
arbitration. 5
Florida's courts generally disapproved of future dispute arbitration clauses
until legislative approval of such agreements in 1957.6 However, even after the
passage of this legislation, the courts of this state often have vitiated such agreements by refusing to compe[ arbitration,- basing their decisions on legislative,
as well as judicial9 exceptions to the 1957 enactment.
This note traces the progress of commercial arbitration in Florida against a
general historical background, focusing specifically on agreements to arbitrate
future disputes. Particular attention is paid to those post-1957 cases that, despite
apparent legislative enactments to the contrary, have held certain arbitration
agreements to be unenforceable. Whether some courts are merely biased
against arbitration, or whether the periodic judicial refusals to compel arbitration are predicated on sound doctrinal bases, is examined as a key question in
assessing the future of commercial arbitration in Florida.
THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN JUDICAL TREATMENT OF ARBITRATION

The roots of arbitration in Anglo-Saxon society have been traced to the
Kentish laws of Aethelberht in the early 600's.10 However, the English courts
developed a hostility toward the process, viewing it as a threat to their jurisdiction.11 Consequently, any attempt by contracting parties to bind themselves to
3. Sturges & Reckson, Common-Law and Statutory Arbitration: Problems Arising From
Their Coexistence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 819, 836 (1962). Two arguments against enforceability
are that by its very nature a voluntary agreement to arbitrate future disputes is unenforceable, and that the courts would have considerable difficulty in compelling such specific performance. Id.
4. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASsoCIATION. THE PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 6
(1928) [hereinafter cited as COMMERCIAL ARBrrATION].
5. In 1920, New York became the first jurisdiction to approve the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate future disputes. 1920 N.Y. Laws, ch. 275, cited in COMMERCiAL ARBrrRATION,
supra note 4, at 8. The statute's constitutionality was upheld one year later in an opinion
written by Judge Cardozo. Berkovitz v. Arbib and Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288
(N.Y. 1921).
6. 1957 Fla. Laws, ch. 57-402, §1. Agreements to arbitrate future disputes were made
"'valid, irrevocable and enforceable."
7. See, e.g., Klosters Rederi A/S v. Arison Shipping Co., 280 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974); Shearson, Hammill and Co. v. Vouis, 247 So. 2d 733 (3d D.C.A.),
cert. denied, 253 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1971).
8. See note 82 infra and accompanying text.
9. See text accompanying notes 76-81 infra.
10. Murray, Arbitration in the Anglo-Saxon and Early Norman Periods, 16 ARB. J. 193,
194 (1961). One ancient case provided that settlement of an injury claim "may" be left to a
few friends of the parties in dispute. The author suggests that the word "may" was indicative
of the voluntary nature of arbitration, even at its origins. Id. at 195.
11. Boskey, A History of Commercial Arbitration in New Jersey (pts. 1-2), 8 RuTcERs-
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an arbitration agreement was undercut by the common law rule that, prior to
the rendition of an award, either party could revoke the authority of an
arbitrator.'12 Eventually, the vitality of agreements to arbitrate future disputes
was abrogated directly by the common law doctrine that such agreements were
unenforceable because they infringed on the courts' jurisdiction.13
The common law notion that agreements to arbitrate future disputes were
unenforceable14 prevailed in the United States unless changed by legislation's
or rare judicial decisions to the contrary.6 Prior to 1920, however, American
arbitration legislation did not include provisions mandating the enforceability
of future dispute agreements.' 7
In 1920, the unenforceability doctrine was dealt a blow by the New York
legislature when it made future dispute agreements valid, enforceable, and
irrevocable. 8 By 1927, six state legislatures 9 and the Congress of the United
States20 had passed similar legislation.
Legislative approval of the enforceability of future dispute agreements
gradually became widespread. By 1977, thirty-four states, including Florida, as
wvell as the federal government, had passed legislation recognizing the enforceability of future dispute agreements. 2' The shift away from the traditional
L. J. 1, 284 at 2 (1977). The hostility toward arbitration may be explained by the
need of the English courts to be financially self-supporting. Id.
12. Vynior's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 595, 597 (K.B. 1609).
13. Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746).
14. Although agreements to arbitrate future disputes were held unenforceable, a question
remained as to whether an action for damages might be successfully brought against one who
breached such an agreement. W. STURGES, COMMERCIAL AarBTRATIoNs AND AwARDs, 82 (1930).
A negative answer was supplied in Cocalis v. Nazlides, 308 Iln. 152, 139 N.E. 95 (1923), in
which the Illinois supreme court held that a future dispute agreement was void and would
not support an action for damages due to the breach thereof. Id. at 159-60, 139 N.E. at 99.
15. Sturges, supra note 14, at 88.
16. Agreements to arbitrate future disputes have been judicially approved in only three
CAMDEN

states: Colorado, Minnesota and Nevada. Note, Arbitration: Enforceability of Future Commerical Arbitration Agreements in Oklahoma, 30 OKLA. L. Rzv. 187, 189 (1977). The cases

cited therein are: Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Bean and Elevator Co., 76 Colo. 409, 232 P. 680
(1925); Park Constr. Co. v. Independent School Dist. No. 32, 209 Minn. 182, 296 N.W. 475
(1941); United Ass'n of Journeymen and Apprentices of Plumbing v. Stone, 76 Nev. 189, 351
P.2d 965 (1960). In 1921, Judge Cardozo indicated that legislative approval was not a prerequisite to the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate future disputes when he stated: "The
judges might have changed the rule themselves if they had abandoned some early precedents,
as at times they seemed inclined to do." Berkovitz v. Arbib and Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261,
276, 130 N.E. 288, 292 (N.Y. 1921).
17. For example, Florida has had an arbitration statute since 1828. Yonge, Arbitration of
an Ordinary Civil Claim in Florida,6 U. FLA. L. REv. 157, 159 (1953). However, before 1957,
the Florida legislation did not provide for the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate future
disputes. Id. at 163.
18. See note 5 supra.
19. New York, New Jersey, California, Oregon, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. ComMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 4, at 8. For specific statutory citations, see Annexation 11,
Id. at 108-205.
20. The federal act, the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§1-14 (1970), applies to
interstate commerce, foreign transactions involving at least $3,000, and maritime transactions.
21. Note, supra note 16, at 191 n.3. Of the 16 remaining states, only Oklahoma and
Vermont have no arbitration legislation whatsoever. Id. at 190.
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anti-arbitration posture undoubtedly has been influenced by the increasingly
heavy caseloads in the courts. As long as alternatives to litigation are sought in
order to relieve court congestion, arbitration seems likely to retain its current
popularity.22
Until 1957 Florida retained substantially the same arbitration legislation it
had enacted in 1828, and which was based on an English arbitration law dating
from 1697.23 The pre-1957 statute2 4 allowed parties in dispute to submit, by
agreement, controversies existing between them to arbitration by making the
agreement a rule of court.2 5 Prior to 1957, the primary weakness of Florida's
arbitration law was its failure to approve the enforceability of future dispute
agreements. Additionally, the law was incomplete, since it covered neither nonjusticiable controversies nor provided for an effective method of enforcing those
agreements that it did cover.26 The main departure of the pre-1957 statute
from common law was that theoretically, once an existing controversy was
properly submitted to arbitration, the submission agreement could be found to
2 7

be irrevocable.

22. The court in Park Constr. Co. v. Independent School Dist. No. 32 compared arbitration to other welcome methods of decreasing court congestion such as settlement, compromise,
and covenants not to sue. 209 Minn. 182, 186, 296 N.W. 475, 477 (1941).
23. Albritton, FloridaArbitration Law, 31 FiA. B. J. 121, 122 (1957). This article presents
a good summary of the pre-1957 Florida arbitration legislation.
24. Act of The Legislative Council, 1828, §9, later codified as FLA. STAT. §57.01-.09 (1953)
(repealed 1965).
25. Id. §57.02. Making an arbitration agreement a rule of court had the effect of bringing
the parties in dispute under the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of enforcing the
award rendered pursuant to arbitration. M. DOMKE, supra note 1, §6.03, at 49-50. The agreement was made a rule of the court by filing it with the court clerk and having it recorded.
Yonge, supra note 17, at 172. Professor Yonge's article provides a good exposition of the
status of arbitration in Florida before the extensive 1957 revision of Florida statutory law on
the subject.
26. Yonge, supra note 17, at 167. Note that the old FLA. STAT. §57.02 (1953) (repealed
1965) provided in part that an agreement to submit an existing controversy to arbitration
must be filed "in the court which would have jurisdiction of the controversy if it were not
submitted to arbitration." This provision arguably required that any issue for arbitration be
justiciable. See Albritton, supra note 23, at 126 n.59.
37. See Stern & Troetschel, The Role of Modern Arbitration in the Progressive Development of Florida Law, 7 MIAMI L. Q. 205,205 (1953) (citing FLA. STAT. §57.01 (1951) and
Ogden v. Baile, 73 Fla. 1103, 75 So. 794 (1917)). However, neither the statute nor the cited
case directly supports the proposition that submission agreements are irrevocable. Ogden
merely held that if arbitration was properly made a rule of the court and all statutory requirements were complied with, the resulting award had the effect of a judgment of the
court. 73 Fla. at 1107-08, 75 So. at 796. There appears to be no Florida case law directly supporting the irrevocability of the submission of existing disputes to arbitration under pre1957 Florida legislation. See also Yonge, supra note 17, at 165, in which the author notes that
although the pre-1957 statute did not expressly provide that submission agreements were irrevocable, most courts have upheld the irrevocability of such an agreement absent a showing
of good cause. Unless a properly sumitted agreement was irrevocable, it is difficult to see any
substantial advantage in making an arbitration agreement a rule of the court. In 1953, the
Florida supreme court hinted that a submission agreement might be irrevocable. In refusing
to enforce a future dispute agreement, the court said that such an agreement is, "at least
until a subsequent valid submission agreement is entered into, voidable at will by either
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The Florida courts repeatedly declined to establish a judicial rule that
future dispute agreements were enforceable,2 8 steadfastly clinging to the timeworn doctrine that enforcing such agreements would infringe on the courts'
jurisdiction.29 As late as 1956, the year before drastic legislative alteration of
Florida's arbitration law took place, the Florida supreme court affirmed the
viability of this common law doctrine 0 and failed to grasp a late opportunity
to validate future dispute agreements judicially.
THE FLORIDA ARmTRATMON CODE

Prior to the enactment in 1957 of the Florida Arbitration Code, 31 commentators had been urging that agreements to arbitrate future disputes be
made enforceable.32 Noting the potential for commercial growth in Florida,
some commentators argued that a legal climate in which commercial disputes
could be solved without undue delay or the detriments of litigation would help
attract industry to the state. 32 In response, twenty-two new sections- 4 entitled
the "Florida Arbitration Code"3 5 were added to the already existing arbitration
legislation.- The "old" arbitration legislation was repealed in 1965,37 and in
1967 the remaining Florida Arbitration Code was transferred to a different
chapter and renumbered.38
The Florida Arbitration Code is based on the Uniform Arbitration Act, 39
which was proposed in 1955 and amended in 1956.40 A key provision made
agreements to arbitrate future controversies arising between contracting parties
"valid, enforceable, and irrevocable without regard to the justiciable character
party at any time before an award is made . . . [emphasis added]." Fenster v. Makovsky, 67
So. 2d 427, 429 (Fla. 1953).
28. See, e.g., Pacific Mills v. Hillman Garment, Inc., 87 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1956); Fenster v.
Makovsky, 67 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1953).
29. Fenster v. Makovsky, 67 So. 2d 427, 429 (Fla. 1953).
30. Pacific Mills v. Hillman Garment, Inc., 87 So. 2d 599, 602 (Fla. 1956).
31. Enacted by 1957 Fla. Laws, ch. 57-402, §§1-22 and codified in FLA. STAT. §§57.10-.31
(1957) (currently codified in FrA. STAT. §§682.01-.22 (1977)).
32. See, e.g., authorities cited in notes 16, 23, and 27 supra.
33. Albritton, supra note 23, at 128; Arbuse, The General Case for Arbitration, 31 FL&.
B. J. 129, 132 (1957).

34. 1957 Fla. Laws, ch. 57-402, §§1-22.
35. Id. §22.
36. The existing legislation, numbered §57.01-.09, was not repealed and the new legislation was codified as §§57.10-.31. At least two commentators had suggested that the enactment
of the new law without a concurrent repealing of the old law would result in co-mingling
and confusion. Sturges S. Reckson, supra note 3, at 823 n.11. However, there is a notable
absence of case law arising from feared potential confusion. Nonetheless, the Florida Legislature repealed the "old" arbitration law, FLA. STAT. §57.01-.09 (1957), in 1965, 1965 Fla. Laws,
ch. 65-127, §1.
37. 1965 Fla. Laws, ch. 65-127, §1.
38. 1967 Fla. Laws, ch. 67-254, §12, transferred §§57.10-.31 from chapter 57 to chapter 682
and renumbered them § §682.01-.22, respectively.
39. 7 U.L.A. 3, §§1-25 (1970).
40. Id. at 1. Minnesota, in 1957, was the first state to adopt the uniform act. Pirsig, The
Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act and the Lincoln Mills Case, 42 MINN. L. REV. 333, 333
(1958). Florida soon followed in basing its law on the uniform act, with some minor variations.
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of the controversy." 41 The act also provided specific procedures for enforcement
of arbitration agreements 42 and thereby remedied the three main weaknesses of
the prior law: unenforceability of future dispute agreements, lack of a provision concerning nonjusticiable controversies, and lack of adequate enforce43
ment mechanisms.
The Florida Legislature departed from the Uniform Arbitration Act in the
statutory provisions dealing with the scope and enforceability of arbitration
agreements. 44 First, the statute omitted the sentence of the original uniform act
that made its provisions applicable to labor contracts. 45 This omission may be
explained by the existence of other statutory provisions at the time of adoption
of the arbitration act that specifically applied to arbitration of labor disputes
involving public utilities. 46 Another explanation could be derived from the
basic difference between labor and commerical arbitration; 47 commercial arbitration functions as a substitute for litigation, while labor arbitration is a
substitute for industrial strife. 48 However, the Florida code does not expressly
exclude labor contracts from its coverage, and conceivably could apply to
arbitration agreements contained therein. 49 Second, the statute omitted the
phrase in the uniform act providing that an arbitration agreement shall be
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, "save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract."50 This phrase could be construed
as excluding fraud as an arbitrable issue.51 Therefore, the omission of the
phrase arguably broadens the scope of arbitrable issues in Florida. However,
the Minnesota supreme court has attached no significance to the omission of
the phrase in comparing its arbitration law to Florida's.52
41. FLA. STAT. §682.02 (1977).
42. FLA. STAT. §§682.03-.22 (1977).
43. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
44. FLA. STAT. §682.02 (1977).
45. Uniform Arbitration Act, 7 U.L.A. 3, §1 (1970) states in part: "This act also applies
to arbitration agreements between employers and employees or between their respective representatives [unless otherwise provided in the agreement]."
46. FLA. STAT. §§453.01-.18 (1977). Maine dealt with a similar conflict in a different
manner by adding a section to the arbitration statute providing: "Nothing in this chapter
shall be deemed to repeal or amend Title 26, chapter 9-A, entitled Municipal Public Employees Labor Relation Law." 7 U.L.A. 9 (1971-77 Supp.).
47. M. DOMKE, supra note 1, §1.02, at 4-5. Massachusetts, in recognition of the difference
between commercial and labor arbitration, passed separate statutes covering each. Id. at 5.
48. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578 (1960). The Court stated furiher that a collective bargaining agreement is more than a
contract. "[I]t is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot
wholly anticipate." Id. For a good discussion of the differences between labor and commercial arbitration, see Comment, State Arbitration Statutes Applicable to Labor Disputes, 19
Mo. L. REv. 280 (1954).
49. This matter has not yet been litigated in Florida.
50. Uniform Arbitration Act, 7 U.L.A. 3, §1 (1970).
51. See Pirsig, supra note 40, at 337.
52. Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp. of America, 292 Minn. 334, 197 N.W.2d 448 (1972).
The Minnesota supreme court, dealing with a fraudulent inducement issue from a conflict of
laws perspective, found the differences between the Minnesota act (which retained the phrase
quoted in the text above) and the Florida act to be "slight differences [that] . . . do not
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The Florida Arbitration Code appears to leave little room for judicial discretion,53 as it is couched mainly in mandatory rather than permissive terminology.5 4 The code is broad in its coverage -5 and displays a very clear legislative posture in favor of arbitration. However, the Florida courts have been inconsistent in their application of the code and, as late as 1973, have relied on
the common law tradition that arbitration should not be used to oust the
courts of their jurisdiction. 56
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FLORIDA ARBITRATION CODE

Statutes approving agreements to arbitrate future disputes have been attacked as violative of state constitutional provisions establishing the jurisdiction of the courts and guaranteeing the right to trial by jury, as well as the
federal constitution's proscription of any law that impairs the obligation of a
contract.57 However, Florida courts have not found any portion of the Florida
Arbitration Code unconstitutional. Neither have the courts confirmed the
constitutionality of the law, preferring instead to refuse to pass on the issue
when specifically raised. 58 Although unresolved in Florida, the constitutionality
of modern arbitration statutes has generally been upheld in other jurisdictions.5 9
affect the issues in this case." Id. at 339, 197 N.W.2d at 452. Instead, the court found that
fraudulent inducement is not an arbitrable issue if the parties did not intend to arbitrate the
issue and if the party seeking relief proceeds to avoid the agreement by seeking rescission. Id.
at 248-49, 197 N.W.2d at 456.
53. See M. DoAmE, supra note 1, §18.01, at 164.
54. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §682.02 (1977), which provides that agreements "shall be valid,
enforceable, and irrevocable . . ": FLA. STAT. §682.03(1) (1977), which provides that if no
substantial issue exists as to the making of an agreement, the court "shall grant the application"[for a court order to compel arbitration]. This same section also provides that an "order
for arbitration shall not be refused on the grounds that the claim in issue lacks merit or
bona fides or because any fault or grounds for the claim sought to be arbitrated have not
been shown." Id. §682.03(5) [emphasis added].
55. See notes 50-52 supra and accompanying text.
56. Klosters Rederi A/S v. Arison Shipping Co., 280 So. 2d 678, 681 (Fla. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974).
57. See notes 58-65 infra and accompanying text.
58. Shearson, Hammill & Co. v. Vouis, 247 So. 2d 733, 735 n.2 (3d D.C.A.), cert. denied,
253 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1971); Cruger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 So. 2d 690, 694 n.I (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1964).
59. See, e.g., Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1932) (in maritime and
admiralty cases, Congress may determine the nature of proceedings that are proper to conduct
the administration of justice); Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 25
F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1928) (nonapplicability of act to labor disputes was not arbitrary and there-

fore constitutional); Snyder v. Superior Court in and for Amador County, 24 Cal. App. 2d 263,
74 P.2d 782 (1937) (arbitration is an authorized procedure allowing just settlements of disputes
without the necessity for litigation); Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 220 N.Y. 261, 130
N.E. 288 (N.Y. 1921). (See text accompanying notes 60-68 infra). Contra, Opinion of the
Justices, 283 A.2d 832 (Del. 1971), where the Delaware supreme court found a provision for

arbitration of matters of cancellation of certain insurance agency contracts to be unconstitutional since the law purported to make the decision of the arbitrators final, thus barring
judicial review. The court also found the law to be violative of art. 1, §10g of the United
States Constitution as it impaired existing contracts. Notice that the Florida code provides
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An early defense of the constitutionality of arbitration legislation providing
for the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate future disputes was propounded by then Judge, later Justice Cardozo for the New York Court of
Appeals in 1921.160 The relevance of that opinion to Florida law is enhanced by
the existence of provisions in the Florida constitution analogous to those in
the New York constitution that were held not to be violated by New York's
arbitration legislation. 6 ' In Berkovitz v. Arbib and Houlberg, Inc., 62 Judge
Cardozo found that the state constitution's guarantee of the right to trial by
64
jury63 could be waived by a voluntary agreement to arbitrate future disputes.
He then rejected the argument that the general jurisdiction of the courts as
preserved by the New York constitution was infringed upon by specific enforcement of future dispute agreements, stating: "Jurisdiction exists that rights
may be maintained. Rights are not maintained that jurisdiction may exist."6s
He added that the court's jurisdiction was not renounced by a decision to uphold an arbitration agreement, but instead, the exercise of such jurisdiction
was adapted in time and manner to the convention of the parties.66 After deal-

ing with the state constitutional questions, Cardozo summarily dismissed the

argument that legislation validating future dispute agreements violated the
federal constitutional provision proscribing any state from passing a law "impairing the [o]bligations of [c]ontracts."6 7 He reasoned that the enforcement of
arbitration clauses would strengthen, rather than impair, contractual obligations.68
Since modern arbitration statutes have been held constitutional6- - with the

for judicial review of the decision of arbitrators. See FLA. STAT. §§682.13, 682.14, 682.20 (1977).
For a discussion of the standards of judicial review and specifically, of the orthodox doctrine
that an award cannot be attacked due to failure of the arbitrators to apply correctly rules of
substantive law, see Note, Substantive Law in Arbitration Proceedings, 12 U. FLA. L. REv. 93
(1959).
60. Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921).
61. Id. See notes 63 & 65 infra.
62. 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921).
63. Note that the same guarantee is made by the Florida Constitution. FLA. CONST. art. 1,
§22. The Florida Constitution also provides that "[t]he courts shall be open to every person
for redress of any injury .... " Id. §21. The rationale that a party waives his right to a jury
trial by entering into an arbitration agreement would appear to be equally applicable to the
constitutional right to redress in the courts.
64. 230 N.Y. at 273, 130 N.E. at 290. But see Widiss, Perspectives on Uninsured Motorist
Coverage, 62 Nw. L. REV. 497, 527-48 (1967). "The issue might be restated in terms of
whether the acceptance by the insured of a unilaterally-drafted arbitration provision buried
in a detailed and complex multipaged document is an adequate basis upon which to predicate
the waiver of the right to a judicial determination of the specified controversies." Id. at 533.
For a similar argument, see also Recent Developments, Enforcement of Arbitration Provisions
in Uninsured Motorist Insurance, 15 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1962).
65. 230 N.Y. at 274, 130 N.E. at 291. The Florida Constitution similarly vests judicial
power in the supreme court, district courts of appeal, circuit courts and county courts. FLA.
CONST. art. V, §1.
66. 230 N.Y. at 275, 130 N.E. at 292.
67. U.S. CONsr. art. 1, §10.
68. 230 N.Y. at 276, 130 N.E. at 292.
69. See note 59 supra.
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exception of a Delaware statute that impliedly barred any judicial review 7o - it
seems unlikely that a Florida court would invalidate the Florida Arbitration
Code on constitutional grounds. 1 Although not reflected by a finding of unconstitutionality, a disfavor for the rationale that an arbitration agreement
operates as a waiver of judicial relief72 may nonetheless be exemplified by a
court's refusal to specifically enforce an arbitration agreement when it is embodied in an adhesion contract.J3
BASES FOR JUDICAL REFUSAL TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

The Florida Arbitration Code specifically delineates two methods for taking
an issue out of the code's coverage. First, contracting parties may stipulate that
the code will not be applicable.74 Secondly, an application for an order to
compel arbitration will be denied if the court finds that no agreement to
arbitrate was made. 75 Florida courts, however, have not always restricted themselves to these narrowly drawn guidelines, and have based refusals to uphold
agreements to arbitrate future disputes on a myriad of factors, including: allegations of fraud combined with complicating factors,76 avoidance of a contract by rescission, 77 inconsistent conduct resulting in waiver,78 lack of a con-

70. Id.

71. Even more difficult constitutional questions may be posed by compulsory arbitration,
a procedure whereby a party is required by statute to submit certain types of claims to arbitration. Although Florida has no compulsory arbitration legislation, Pennsylvania passed
such a law in 1951 which was subsequently upheld as constitutional. Smith Case, 381 Pa. 223,
112 A.2d 625 (Pa. 1955), appeal dismissed sub norn. Smith v. Wissler, 350 U.S. 858 (1955). For

a discussion of the Pennsylvania law, see Rosenberg &Schubin, Trial by Lawyers: Compulsory
Arbitration of Small Claims in Pennsylvania, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 448 (1961). See generally
Sturges, Compulsory Arbitration- What Is It?, 30 FORDHAm L. Ray. 1 (1961) for a discussion

of the process.
72. See notes 63 &64 supra and accompanying text.
73.

See note 64 supra. Also, see generally Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts

About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUr. L. Rav. 629 (1943) for a discussion of adhesion contracts in modern industrial society and the courts' reaction to them.
74. FLA. STAT. §682.02 (1977) provides in part that the "act shall not apply to any such
agreement or provision to arbitrate in which it is stipulated that this law shall not apply or
to any arbitration or award thereunder."
75. FrA. STAT. §682.03(1) (1977) states: "If the court is satisfied that no substantial issue
exists as to the making of the [arbitration] agreement or provision, it shall grant the application. If the court shall find that a substantial issue is raised as to the making of the agreement or provision, it shall summarily hear and determine the issue and, according to its
determination, shall grant or deny the application." The code also provides for staying an
arbitration proceeding "commenced or about to be commenced" if the court finds that no
arbitration agreement subject to the code's coverage exists. FLA. STAT. §682.03(4) (1977).
76. Klosters Rederi A/S v. Arison Shipping Co., 280 So. 2d 678, 681 (Fla. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974).
77. R. B. F. Management Co. v. Sunshine Towers Apt. Residences Assoc., Inc., 352 So. 2d
561 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977).
78. Klosters Rederi A/S v. Arison Shipping Co., 280 So. 2d 678, 681 (Fla. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974); American S. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 198 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
1967); Hall v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 189 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1966).
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80
troverted issue, 79 avoidance of piecemeal litigation, and the existence of a law
81
that controls over the arbitration code. Familiarity with the applications of
statutory and judicial exceptions to the enforceability of future dispute agreements is necessary for a dra ftsman to insure the effectiveness of such an agreement.

Stipulationof Inapplicabilityof the Code
In drafting an effective agreement to arbitrate future disputes, a draftsman
should strive to avoid language that might be construed as stipulating that the
Florida Arbitration Code does not govern its enforcement. The code itself pro82
vides that a stipulation of inapplicability will be given effect. However, such
83
a stipulation would be self-defeating because an arbitration clause not within
the code's coverage will be governed by the common law principle that future
84
dispute agreements are unenforceable. On the other hand, not all contractual
stipulations varying the procedural aspects of the Florida Arbitration Code
necessarily take the arbitration agreement out of the code. For example, a provision calling for arbitration according to the rules of the American Arbitration
5
Association does not preclude application of the code. However, the courts
have held that a provision requiring arbitration in another jurisdiction- or
87
under the laws of another jurisdiction constitutes a rejection of the Florida
Arbitration Code, consequently rendering an agreement to arbitrate future
disputes unenforceable in Florida.
s8
In Damora v. Stresscon International,Inc., the Florida supreme court, in
response to a certified question, held that "an agreement to arbitrate future
disputes in another jurisdiction is outside the authority of the Florida Arbitration Code ... and such a provision renders the agreement to arbitrate voidable
8 9
at the instance of either party." 1 The court based its holding on a dual ration79. Mills v. Robert W. Gottfried, Ic., 272 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1973).
80. Cruger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1964).
81. Shearson, Hammill and Co. v. Vouis, 247 So. 2d 733 (3d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 253
So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1971).
82. See FLA. STAT. §682.02 (1977), quoted in part at note 74 supra.
83. See Wickes Corp. v. Industrial Financial Corp., 493 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1974), in
which the Florida Code was held inapplicable and the arbitration agreement unenforceable.
The contract involved in this case expressly provided: "The provisions of chapter 682. Florida
Statutes, shall not apply to this arbitration or the award thereunder" [emphasis omitted]. Id.
at 1175.
84. Id.
85. Florida's courts have uniformly held that a stipulation that arbitration be conducted
under the rules of the American Arbitration Association does not remove an arbitration agreement from the coverage of the Florida Arbitration Code. See, e.g., Netherlands Ins. Co. v.
Moore, 190 So. 2d 191, 194 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1966); Hall v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 189 So.
2d 224 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1966); Bohlmann v. Allstate Ins. Co., 171 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1965).
86. Damora v. Stresscon Int'l Inc., 324 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1975).
87. Knight v. H.S. Equities, Inc., 280 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1973).
88. 324 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1975).
89. Id. at 82. The construction contract involved provided that "[alrbitration of all
questions in dispute under this agreement shall be in New York City, New York . . .'" [emphasis in original]. Id. at 81.
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ale: first, the Florida Arbitration Code does not authorize Florida courts to
compel arbitration in another jurisdiction; secondly, since the agreement failed
to specify that Florida law and procedure should govern, but did specify that
arbitration take place in New York City under the arbitration procedure of the
American Institute of Architects, the inference was that New York's arbitration
law should be controlling.90
Knight v. H.S. Equities, Inc.9 involved a brokerage agreement that expressly provided that arbitration be conducted in accordance with the laws of
New York. 92 The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that such an agreement
is not in compliance with the Florida Arbitration Code and therefore was not
specifically enforceable in Florida. 93 The court also questioned its ability to
compel a Florida resident to go into another jurisdiction to arbitrate.94
It appears that in order to assure the applicability of the Florida code to
arbitration agreements the contracting parties should include an express provision calling for its applicability in the contract, although a clause calling for
the application of alternative arbitration procedures may be safely coupled

90. Id. at 82. The Court held further that "[a]bsent the statutory authority of chapter
682 to enforce the arbitration provision, the controlling law of this state dearly makes an
arbitration provision voidable at the instance of either party ... "Id.
91. 280 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1973).
92. Id. at 458.
93. Id. The court relied on two statutory provisions: FLA. STAT. §682.02 (1977), which
states that the act shall not apply where it is so stipulated, the court apparently inferring
such a stipulation, and FLA. STAT. §682.18 (1975), which confers jurisdiction on the court to
enforce agreements "providing for arbitration in this state." It is interesting that the court,
instead of applying New York law, held that an agreement not in compliance with the
Florida Arbitration Code is not specifically enforceable in this state. This interpretation of
the Florida Arbitration Code places it in direct conflict with a Uniform Commercial Code
section enacted in Florida which provides that "when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law
either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties." FLA.
STAT. §671.105 (1977). Although this section may not have been applicable to the Knight fact
situation, it reflects the general conflict of laws rule in the contract area. See 6A A. CoRmIN,
CoNTRAcrs §1446 (1962 & Supp. 1964). However, an obligation enforceable in another jurisdiction will not be enforced in Florida if enforcement would be contrary to Florida's public
policy. See Dorado Beach Hotel Corp. v. W. A. Jernigan, 202 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1967)
(gambling obligation, although valid where created, not enforced in Florida because enforcement would be contrary to public policy). But since Florida has legislatively validated agreements to arbitrate future disputes, enforcement of such an agreement under the similar laws
of another state would not be against a public policy expressly approved by Florida's legislature. Nonetheless, this argument has not been considered by Florida's courts and presently it
appears that ordinary conflicts rules may not be applicable to the area of arbitration.
94. 280 So. 2d at 459 n.2 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1973). The court cited Annot., 12 A.L.R. 3d
892, 903 (1967) for the proposition that the majority view is that a court may not compel a
resident to go into another jurisdiction to arbitrate. The minority view is illustrated in
Wright v. Round the Corner Restaurants of La., Inc. 252 So. 2d 341 (Ct. of App. La. 1971).
In that case, a dispute arose out of an employment contract containing an agreement to arbitrate such disputes in Denver, Colorado. The Louisiana court held that the agreement was
"not so unreasonable as to be held unenforceable here .. . Id. at 345. While basing its decision on the reasonableness of the provision, the court expressed no reluctance in compelling
arbitration in a foreign jurisdiction. Id.
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with it.95 Similarly, an express provision stipulating inapplicability of the code
will assuredly achieve a self-defeating purpose. 96 However, contract terms that
are facially equivocal may be construed to preclude arbitration under the
Florida code 97 and consequently should be avoided.
Waiver of the ContractualRight to Arbitrate
Florida's courts have agreed that a party may waive his contractual right to
98
arbitration by taking actions inconsistent with that right, thus giving the
other contracting party the option of ignoring an arbitration agreement completely and proceeding with litigation. Frequently a waiver has been found
when a party, in disregard of an arbitration agreement, files suit prior to filing
a motion to compel arbitration. 99 Waiver also has been found when a defendant, subsequent to his demand for arbitration, filed a counterclaim that
included a request for a jury trial. 100 In that case, the defendant's petition to
compel arbitration had been denied by the trial court and was awaiting disposition on appeal. 01' The Florida supreme court held simply that the defendant's conduct was inconsistent with his prior demand for arbitration and
therefore constituted a waiver of that right.10 2
95. See Netherlands Ins. Co. v. Moore, 190 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1966). The court
stated a broad holding: "An agreement to employ rules of procedure different from those
provided in the Code does not constitute a stipulation that the remaining provisions of the
." Id. at 194. This judicial construction goes beyond the
Code itself shall not apply ..
Code's explicit allowance for the parties to choose a method for the appointment of arbitrators or an umpire. FLA. STAT. §682.04 (1977). The courts have specifically allowed parties
to agree to arbitrate under the rules of the American Arbitration Association while retaining
coverage under the Florida Code. See note 85 supra. Beyond this, it remains unclear to what
extent arbitration procedures may be varied without removing the arbitration agreement
from the Florida Code.
96. See notes 82-84 supra and accompanying text.
97. See notes 86-94 supra and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Ojus Industries, Inc. v. Mann, 221 So. 2d 780, 782 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1969);
Hall v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 189 So. 2d 224, 225 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1966); Mike Bradford &
Co. v. Gulf States Steel Co., 184 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1966).
99. E.g., Ojus Industries, Inc. v. Mann, 221 So. 2d 780, 782 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1969).
100. Klosters Rederi A/S v. Arison Shipping Co., 280 So. 2d 678, 681 (Fla. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974). The inconsistent conduct necessary for a finding of waiver has
not been restricted to the filing of a suit. See Hall v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 189 So. 2d 224
(Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1966). In that case, plaintiff-insured was unsuccessful in obtaining arbitration
because defendant-insurer refused to join a special claims tribunal. The court found that
defendant-insurer's subsequent failure to make its own demand and application for arbitration constituted a waiver thereof. Id. at 226.
101. Klosters Rederi A/S v. Arison Shipping Co., 280 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1131 (1974).
102. Id. Cf. King v. Thompson & McKinnon, 352 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1977).
"Repudiation of an arbitration clause by a defendant, in the form of an answer to the
complaint without demand for arbitration constitutes an abandonment of the right to
arbitration .... " Id. at 1235. Even though in King the motion to compel arbitration was not
made until after the answer had been filed, the case supports the proposition that in order
to preserve one's right to arbitration, any pleading filed either before or after a motion to
compel arbitration has been made should interpose the arbitration agreement as a bar to an
ordinary civil action.
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In contrast to that opinion, a later decision by the Third District Court of
Appeal in Collier Land Corp. v. Royal Palm Beach Realty, Inc. resulted in no
finding of waiver, despite the fact that the plaintiff, prior to filing a motion to
stay trial and compel arbitration, had filed a complaint.1° 3 The court affirmed
the decision below granting the motion without even discussing the waiver contention.' 04 Instead, it merely cited to the Florida Arbitration Code section
rendering agreements to arbitrate future disputes enforceable. 0 5 The Collier
Land Corp. decision is in direct conflict with a decision rendered by the same
court seven years earlier in which the court stated that, "where a plaintiff, in
disregard of his right to arbitration, files suit for determination of the contro0
versy, he will be held to have waived his right to compel arbitration thereof."1 8
However, the Collier Land Corp. decision might have been affected by the fact
that the arbitration agreement contained a provision making the decision of
the arbitrators "a condition precedent to any right of legal action that the
parties may have against each other pursuant to this [a]greement." 107 If such
clause was indeed relevant to the decision, Collier Land Corp. indicates that
parties to a contract could stipulate in advance that behavior inconsistent with
the arbitration agreement will not constitute a waiver of the rights under that
agreement. 0
Although the requirements for a waiver of a contractual right to arbitration
have been clearly stated, 0 9 adherence to those requirements has not been consistent in Florida. The Collier Land Corp. decision signals a departure from
the established waiver notion. If the case is not merely an aberration, it signals
a closer adherence to applicable arbitration legislation and a reluctance to allow parties to escape a contractual obligation by the judicially developed
waiver doctrine.
InconsistentStatutory Provisions
Despite legislation validating agreements to arbitrate future disputes, sometimes overriding policy concerns reflected in other legislative provisions render
those agreements unenforceable. For instance, questions have been raised in
some jurisdictions concerning the enforceability of arbitration agreements in

103. 338 S.2d 859 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1976).
104. Id. at 860-61.
105. FLA. STAT. §682.02 (1977).
106. Ojus Industries, Inc. v. Mann, 221 So. 2d 780, 782 (Fla. 3d. D.C.A. 1969).
107. 338 So. 2d at 860. However, this explanation has been rejected in the past by the
same court, which held that "agreements to arbitrate, even though expressed as conditions
precedent to legal action, may be waived." Mike Bradford & Co. v. Gulf States Steel Co., 184
So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1966).
108. Note that in Collier Land Corp. the court did not allude to the condition precedent
language in the arbitration agreement as a basis for its finding of no waiver. Therefore, the
contention is rather tenuous that the case impliedly rejected the rule that a waiver may be
found despite condition-precedent language.
109. See text accompanying note 106 supra. That narrow "definition" of waiver is not
exclusive, however. See note 100 supra.
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which corporationslo and partnerships"'l are involved. Similarly, problems

with the application of the arbitration statute may arise when arbitration conflicts with the policy of an applicable securities law. That was the basis for the
holding by the Third District Court of Appeal in Shearson, Hammill & Co. v.
Vouis"1 2 that arbitration of issues of fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of
fiduciary duties was inconsistent with the Florida Securities Law' 13 which controlled over the Florida Arbitration Code." 4 The court based its decision on a
110. Policy conflicts between modern arbitration legislation and corporation laws have not
been explored by Florida's courts although they have been considered elsewhere. For an extensive discussion of arbitration within the corporate setting, see O'Neal, Resolving Disputes
in Closely Held Corporations: Intra-institutionalArbitration, 67 HARv. L. REv. 786 (1954).
Generally, arbitration agreements dealing with policy decisions and entered into by a corporation's directors are inconsistent with corporate norms which vest management and policy
control of the corporation in the directors. Id. at 797-98. But in New York, the modern trend
is to allow arbitration in the closely held corporation setting. Id. at 803. However, the possibility remains that other jurisdictions will take a contrary view, especially if management
and policy issues are involved in the arbitration agreement. Id. at 797, But under some
modern corporation laws, the objection that arbitration undercuts the duties of the directors is obviated by statutory provisions specifically allowing the delegation of management
and policymaking discretion traditionally vested in the directors. See Kessler, Arbitration of
Intra-CorporateDisputes Under New York Laws (pt. 1), 19 ARB. J. 1, 10 (1964). Florida's
corporation law specifically allows such delegation of management responsibilities: "All corporate powers shall be exercised by .. .and affairs of a corporation shall be managed under
the direction of, a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or
in the articles of incorporation." FLA. STAT. §607.111(1) (1977) [emphasis added].
111. As with corporations, potential problems with arbitration in the partnership setting
have not been the subject of litigation in Florida but have been explored in other jurisdictions. See Fisher, Dissolution of Partnerships as Arbitrable Issues, 23 ARE. J. 85 (1968). The
author examines the posture of the New York judiciary toward arbitration when the issue to
be arbitrated involves dissolution of a partnership. The relevance of his examination is enhanced by the fact that New York, like Florida, has adopted the Uniform Partnership Act.
FLA. STAT. §§670.56-.77 (1977). The Act clearly sets forth the procedures for dissolution of a
partnership, stating that dissolution be by decree of court. Id. §620.715. However, the commentator has concluded from his analysis of New York case law that the trend in that state
favors construing the Uniform Partnership Act as a consensual act, thus giving the partners
flexibility in providing for dissolution procedures not specifically delineated in the Act, including the arbitration procedure. Fisher, supra, at 94-95. This "trend" has been solidified by
Steinberg v. Steinberg, 38 A.D.2d 57, 327 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1971), which held that if dissolution
was within the breadth of the arbitration clause, arbitrators may direct dissolution. Id. at 58,
327 N.Y.S.2d at 247. The order rendered by the appellate division was affirmed in a
memorandum decision by the Court of Appeals. Steinberg v. Steinberg, 32 N.Y.2d 671, 295
N.E.2d 798, 343 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1973). Whether Florida will adopt such a liberal posture is
presently unknown.
112. 247 So. 2d 733 (3d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 253 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1971).
113. FA. STAT. §§517.01-.33 (1977).
114. The court also based its decision "upon the proposition that agreements to arbitrate
controversies in the future cannot and should not oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred upon them by organic law." Shearson, Hammill & Co. v. Vouis, 247 So. 2d 733, 735
(3d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 253 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1971). The court cited Cruger v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 162 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1964) as a basis for its reasoning, noting that the decision
was rendered "notwithstanding a statutory provision which attempted to create an exception
to the well-settled doctrine that an agreement to arbitrate a dispute in the future will not be
enforced as an attempt to oust the court's jurisdiction." 247 So. 2d at 785. Such language
appears to be in flagrant disregard of the legislative enactment.
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United States Supreme Court case, Wilko v. Swan, 15 and expressly adopted its
reasoning."16
In Wilko, petitioner brought an action for damages against his brokers
under the Securities Act of 1933."17 Petitioner alleged that the brokers had induced him to buy stock by falsely representing information indicating that the
market value of the stock would soon rise." 8 Respondent moved to stay the
trial on the ground that the margin agreements controlled the relationship of
the parties and required that all disputes arising out of the agreements be resolved by arbitration."1 The Supreme Court held that respondent's motion to
stay the trial pursuant to the federal arbitration law 20 must be denied. 21 The
Court based its holding on the ground that an agreement to arbitrate future
disputes was an attempted waiver of the parties' right to select a judicial forum
for the resolution of a controversy. 22 Since the Securities Act confers jurisdiction upon the district, state, and territorial courts for the enforcement of
liability arising from the act'1 2 and furthermore, expressly prohibits any waiver
of the provisions of the act,

24

the arbitration agreement was invalidated. The

Court also reasoned that since the act was passed to protect the securities buyer
who is generally in a disadvantaged bargaining position, 25 "the exercise of
judicial direction [is required] to fairly assure" the effectiveness of its protective
provisions.126 The dissent, however, did not perceive a sound basis for the
majority's skepticism toward arbitration and stated that there was nothing to

115. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
116. Shearson, Hammill & Co. v. Vouis, 247 So. 2d 733, 735 (3d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 253
So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1971).
117. 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77aa (1970).
118. 346 U.S. at 428-29.
119. Id. at 429.
120. 9 U.S.C. §§1-14 (1970).
121. 346 U.S. at 438.
122. Id. at 434.
123. Id. at 432-33.
124. The Court quoted 15 U.S.C. §77n (1970): "Any condition, stipulation or provision
binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this
subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the commission shall be void." 346 U.S. at 430
n.6. Florida's securities law contains no such provision but the court in Shearson, Hammill
and Co. evidently adopted Wilko's broader rationale that arbitration does not provide sufficient protection for the disadvantaged securities buyer. See text accompanying notes 125 &
126 infra.
125. 346 U.S. at 434-35. The rationale of Wilko, therefore, may not be applicable if the
parties in dispute have equal bargaining power. See Comment, Contracts:Arbitration Clauses
in InternationalAgreements Held Enforceable, 59 MINN. L. Ray. 436, 439 (1974). This comment discusses Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), which held that if an
international commercial contract is involved, the arbitration agreement contained therein is
enforceable in spite of prevailing American securities laws. The Court recognized that in the
case of an international contract, uncertainty as to which country's law should apply in dispute resolution often exists. Therefore, a contractual stipulation of the proper forum is a
prerequisite to assuring orderliness in the international business transaction. Consequently,
refusal to enforce an international arbitration agreement would result in the frustration of
this goal. Id. at 516.
126. 346 U.S. at 437.
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indicate that the arbitral system "would not afford the plaintiff the rights to
'
which he is entitled.'

27

Florida's application of the Wilko rationale is in accord with the acceptance
it has received in other states..28 However, the Third District Court of Appeal's
express holding in Shearson,Hammill and Co. was that arbitration of issues of
fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duties was inconsistent with
the Florida Securities Law. 129 Therefore, the Florida court's holding restricted
Wilko's broad rationale- that judicial protection afforded by securities law
may not be waived by contractual stipulation - to situations involving the
issues mentioned above. 30 Although that part of the Shearson, Hammill and
Co. decision was narrow in scope, the court also based its decision on the alternate ground that once a court is vested with jurisdiction by organic law, 13 1
an arbitration agreement will not be enforced if it is an attempt to oust the
court of that jurisdiction.Y;2 Conceivably, the court rejuvenated this historical
concept in order to give its decision more breadth, and to afford the court more
flexibility in the future to refuse to compel arbitration despite an apparently
binding agreement.

127. Id. at 439 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
128. See, e.g., Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Products Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 237 N.E.2d
223, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1968); Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson and Curtis, 422 Pa. 66, 220
A.2d 624 (1966). In Aimcee Wholesale Corp., the rationale that some statutory enactments
reflect a policy decision that the public requires a higher degree of protection than is afforded by arbitration was extended in applicability to a New York antitrust case. In Moran,
the Pennsylvania supreme court, dealing with a dispute arising out of a securities transaction,
held that Wilko applied only to future dispute agreements and not to the submission of an
existing controversy to arbitration. 422 Pa. at 70, 220 A.2d at 626. The court, relying on dicta
within the Wilko decision, found that submission of an existing claim to arbitration did not
constitute a waiver barred by the Securities Act. Id. at 70, 220 A.2d at 627.
129. See text accompanying notes 112-114 supra.
130. See Knight v. H. S. Equities, Inc., 280 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1973). The court
refused to apply Shearson, Hammill and Co. to a situation in which "petitioner's complaint
fail[ed] to allege any allegation [sic] of fraud arising from a contractual relationship under
the Florida Securities Law." Id. a! 458.
131. Respondent Vouis had filed a complaint alleging misrepresentation, fraud, and
breach of fiduciary duties in regard to the purchase of securities from petitioner. Shearson,
Hammill & Co. v. Vouis, 247 So. 2d 733, 734 (3d D.C.A.),cert. denied, 253 So. 2d 444 (Fla.
1971). Thereafter, petitioner raised the arbitration agreement as an affirmative defense. Id. at
734.
132. Id. at 735. The court held as it did while explicitly recognizing that the Florida
Arbitration Code dictated a contrary result. See note 114 supra. The rationale behind the
"second holding" of Shearson, Hammill & Co. has been expressly rejected by at least two district courts of appeal in Florida, the second and the fourth. In Mills v. Robert W. Gottfried,
Inc., 272 So. 2d 837, 839 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1973), the court stated: "Respectfully, we decline to
apply the rationale of those [third district] opinions [Shearson, Hammill & Co. and Cruger] to
the present case because in our view the aforementioned opinions do not give effect to the
intention of the legislature ..
" Three years later, the Second District Court of Appeal
adopted the Mills rejection of Shearson, Hammill & Co. Morton Z. Levine & Associates,
Chartered v. Van Deree, 334 So. 2d 287, 288 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1976).
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ArbitrationDenied to Avoid PiecemealDeterminationof Disputes:
The Case of Automobile Insurance Policiesin Florida
An agreement to arbitrate future disputes may be restricted in scope if the
parties to a contract desire that only certain issues be subject to arbitration.
Therefore, a dispute arising out of such a contract may involve both arbitrable
and nonarbitrable issues. In Florida, this situation has arisen in conjunction
with uninsured motorist provisions of automobile insurance policies, which
generally contain an arbitration clause providing that disagreements as to
liability or to the extent of damages be submitted to arbitrators for resolution. 33 The courts have consistently held that the issue of the scope of a policy's
coverage is not included within the clause and is for judicial, rather than
arbitral, determination. 34 Although that point alone is not particularly troublesome, the courts have gone one step further, and for the sake of efficiency have
allowed the court that decides the issue of coverage to adjudicate any remaining issues as well. 13 5 Even though such decisions are expressly based on the fact
that these arbitration agreements did not include the scope of coverage as an
arbitrable issue, the courts may have been influenced by underlying policy
considerations weighing against the arbitrability of automobile insurance contract disputes, 3 6 particularly the adhesive nature of the contracts. 3 7 An examination of the judicial treatment arbitration has received in this specialized
area is valuable in predicting judicial reaction to similar problems arising in
other contexts.
In Crugerv. Allstate Insurance Co.,138 after the insured had instituted arbitration proceedings, the insurer sought declaratory relief, contending that there
was no physical contact between the insured and the alleged hit-and-run driver,
and therefore, no coverage under the policy. 39 The Third District Court of
133. M. DomxE, supra note 1, §513.10, at 132. The commonly used arbitration clause
provides in part: "If any person making claim hereunder and the [insurance] company do
not agree that such person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner .

.

. or do

not agree as to the amount of payment which may be owing... [emphasis added]." Id.
134. See, e.g., Ebens v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 278 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1973); American S. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 198 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1967); Netherlands Ins.
Co. v. Moore, 190 So. 2d 191 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1966); U. S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Williams,
177 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1965); Zeagler v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. of New York, 166
So. 2d 616 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1964); Cruger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1964). Also, see generally King, Arbitrationof Automobile Accident Claims, 14 U. FiA. L. RP,.
328 (1962) for a discussion of the advantages of using arbitration to reduce the number of
automobile accident claims, one of the main sources of court congestion.
135. Cruger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 So. 2d 690, 694 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1964).
136. Some state legislatures, reflecting a policy determination that arbitration does not
provide adequate protection for persons bringing claims under uninsured motorist clauses,
prohibit the use of the arbitration forum for settling such claims. See M. Domi, supra note
1, §13.10, at 132 n.90. The four states that have enacted such legislation are Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina and Virginia. Id. For a positive appraisal of the use of arbitration to
solve disputes under uninsured motorist provisions, see Asken, Arbitration Under the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 1965 INs. L. J. 17 (1965).
137. See notes 64 & 73 supra.
138. Cruger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 So. 2d 690, 694 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1964).
139. Id. at 693.
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Appeal, finding that the issue was a proper one for declaratory relief,14 affirmed the lower court's finding of no coverage. In addition, the court held that
once a party successfully pleads a complaint for declaratory relief, the trial
court should adjudicate all the rights of a party in order to avoid a piecemeal
determination of the controversy.1 41 However, the court failed to recognize that
a piecemeal determination may be avoided as easily by submitting all disputes
initially to arbitration.1 42 TJ-his approach would seem to be justified especially

in situations involving the hit-and-run issue, in which the determination of the
dispute is pertinent not only to coverage, but to the arbitrable issue of liability
as well.'

4

3

In 1967, the First District Court of Appeal expressly recognized that the
Cruger rule allows an insured to escape an apparently binding arbitration
clause by properly filing suit for a declaratory decree on the coverage issue,
thereby vesting the court with the right to determine all of the other issues
involved.1 4 4 Despite this recognition, the court explicitly refused to disagree
with the Cruger result.145 This holding thwarts the clear legislative intent behind the Florida Arbitration Code, which provides for a judicial determination of a preliminary issue, and makes the granting or denial of an order com14
pelling arbitration dependent on that determination.
In 1973, the Third District Court of Appeal limited the applicability of its
holding in Cruger by ruling that the question of whether a particular vehicle
was involved in a hit-and-run accident is not an issue of coverage, but rather,
an issue directly bearing on the insured's right to recovery under the policy

47

140. Id. at 694.
141. Id. "[O]nce either party to an insurance contract is successful in pleading a complaint for declaratory relief . . . [the] court is then fully empowered and should completely
adjudicate all the rights of the parties relating to coverage, liability, damages, etc., in order
that the rights of the parties not be determined in a piecemeal fashion."
142. See Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Garney, 348 Mass. 627, 205 N.E.2d 8 (1965). The
Massachusetts supreme judicial court, dealing with a dispute arising out of an uninsured
motorist clause containing an arbitration agreement, decided to adopt a "logical and practical
view." Id. at 632, 205 N.E.2d at 12. Based on a desire to avoid "piecemeal treatment of a
specified area of dispute," the court held that whether "a particular situation of fact comes
within the policy provisions ... seems to us a matter which . .. may be submitted to arbitration. Examples of such matters are whether the other motorist was or could be identified,
whether he was insured, whether his acts or omissions caused the accident, whether he was
negligent, and whether the insured was guilty of contributory negligence." Id.
143. See Recent Cases, Court Determines Questions of Coverage and Liability Despite
Arbitration Clause in Standard Uninsured Motorist Provision, 78 HARv. L. RaV. 1250, 1250
(1965). This short commentary also questions the constitutionality of arbitration clauses in
insurance contracts since such clauses, if enforced, result in the deprivation of the right to a
jury trial.
144. American S. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 198 So. 2d 850, 852-53 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1967).
145. Id. at 852.
146. FLA. STAT. §682.03(1) (1977) provides in part: "If the court shall find that a substantial issue is raised as to the making of the agreement or provision it shall summarily
hear and determine the issue and, according to its determination, shall grant or deny the
application [for an order compelling arbitration]." The legislature thereby expressly provided
for the "piecemeal" determination of the issues.
147. Ebens v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 278 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973).
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and therefore subject to arbitration. Although the court did not alter the
broad rule that the filing of a suit for declaratory relief on the coverage issue
vests a court with the power to decide all other issues as well, the court's holding may be indicative of a trend toward the judicial expansion of those issues
deemed arbitrable. However, as long as the Cruger rule remains intact, a party
to an automobile insurance policy with uninsured motorist protection may use
a properly pleaded complaint for declaratory decree on the coverage issue as a
valuable tool for avoiding the arbitration agreement contained within the
148
policy.
KlostersRederi A/S
ARBITRAmiLITy OF FRAUD LEp-r UNESOLVED

At first glance, it would appear that a broadly drafted clause stipulating
that all future disputes arising out of a contract be submitted to arbitration
includes the issue of fraud. Nevertheless, judicial opinion on the arbitrability
of fraud has been divided, some courts refusing to compel arbitration when
fraud has been alleged. In Florida, the arbitrability of fraud is presently an
uncertain area and it is not clear whether an allegation of fraud in itself is
sufficient to avoid arbitration.
The Florida supreme court last addressed the fraud issue in 1973 in the
case of Klosters Rederi A/S v. Arison Shipping Co.149 Unfortunately, the court
produced an opinion that has compounded the confusion. In Klosters Rederi,
petitioner's complaint alleged that it entered a contract with Arison Shipping
under the terms of which Arison was to act as ship's agent for Klosters
Rederi. 150 Thereafter, petitioner served a notice of terminationl5l on respondent
for breach of fiduciary duties.1 52 Subsequent to Arison's denial of the alleged
breach,15 3 petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent corporation and
several third party defendants.11' Pursuant to the complaint, a receiver was
appointed to recover certain assets in the custody of Arison and others.155 On
148. The procedural aspects of Ebens v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 278 So. 2d 674
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973), were such that the trial court did not have the opportunity to consider
any factual issue other than whether a hit-and-run driver was involved in the accident.
Specifically, an amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice on the ground that "declaratory judgment does not lie in a case of this type wherein a question of fact will resolve the
issues." Id. at 674. In addition, plaintiff-insured's motion to compel arbitration was dismissed
on the trial court's finding that the hit-and-run issue was not properly determinable in an
arbitration proceeding.
149. 280 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974).
150. Id. at 679.
151. Id. The contract contained provisions for termination and arbitration.
152. Id. The notice included allegations of defalcations and misappropriation of funds by
Arison, as well as failure to attain the average net profits called for by the contract.
153. Id. Arison also demanded $400,000 as a partial payment of damages.
154. Id. Defendants included Ted Arison individually, two subsidiary corporations of
Arson Shipping Co., and three banks. The complaint charged Arison with fraud, misappropriation of funds, and breach of fiduciary duties, and sought an accounting, the appointment of a receiver, and other "extraordinary equitable relief." Id. at 679-80.
155. Id. at 680. The order appointing the receiver was affirmed on appeal. Arison Shipping Co. v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 259 So. 2d 784 (Fla. d D.C.A. 1972).
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the day of appointment, Axison filed a petition to compel arbitration, which
was denied by the trial court. 56 The reversal of the denial on appeal 57 came
before the supreme court on conflict certiorari.' 5
The supreme court stressed the fact that the case was "extremely complicated and complex." 159 It also noted that the "appointment of a receiver was
an extreme and unmistakable jurisdictional act by a court of equity .... "160
The court went on to state that under the "well-settled doctrine" of Shearson,
Hammill and Co.,' 6' an agreement to arbitrate "will not be enforced as an
attempt to oust the court's jurisdiction.' 162 The court noted that where such
complexities as the involvement of third parties, allegations of fraud and
63
breach of fiduciary duties, and the appointment of a receiver are involved,
"equity is far better equipped to afford full and complete relief" 164 than is
arbitration.165
Due to the hodgepodge of factors on which Klosters Rederi was based,-6
67
its effect on arbitration in Florida is rather unpredictable. In a federal case1

156. 280 So. 2d at 680.
157. Arison Shipping Co. v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 268 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1972).
158. 280 So. 2d at 679. The supreme court concluded that the Third District Court of
Appeal's order compelling arbitration conflicted "with those cases hereinafter discussed" and
therefore granted certiorari. Id. Among the cases cited were Moss v. Sperry, 140 Fla. 301, 191
So. 531 (1939) (equity is best equipped to afford complete relief where third parties, allegations of fraud, and breach of fiduciary duties, and a complicated accounting are involved);
Shearson, Hammill and Co. v. Vouis, 247 So. 2d 733 (3d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 253 So. 2d 444
(Fla. 1971) (future dispute agreements will not be enforced to oust the court's jurisdiction);
Ojus Industries, Inc. v. Mann, 221 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1969) (right to arbitrate may be
waived when a party takes action inconsistent with that right).
159. 280 So. 2d at 679.
160. Id. at 680.
161. See note 147 supra. See also text accompanying notes 112-132 supra.
162. Klosters Rederi A/S v. Arison Shipping Co., 280 So. 2d 678, 681 (Fla. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974). Note that the decision reversed by the supreme court was
rendered by the Third District Court of Appeal. Arison Shipping Co. v. Klosters Rederi A/S,
268 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1972). The appellate court did not even discuss the "ousting
the court's jurisdiction" rationale though, ironically, it had re-vitalized this theory only one
year earlier in Shearson, Hammill & Co. v. Vouis, 247 So. 2d 733, 735 (3d D.C.A.), cert. denied,
253 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1971). This apparent inconsistency might be explained by the fact that
in Shearson, HammiUi & Co., jurisdiction was specifically conferred upon the court by the
Florida Securities Law. FIA. STAT. §§517.01-.33 (1977). The Florida supreme court, by relying
on the "ousting the court's jurisdiction" rationale in Klosters Rederi, may have thereby expanded its applicability to situations in which such a controlling statute does not exist.
163. 280 So. 2d at 681.
164. Id., citing Moss v. Sperry, 140 Fla. 301, 191 So. 531 (1939), in which third parties,
fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, and the necessity for a complicated accounting also were
involved. However, the Moss case does not concern an arbitration agreement.
165. Additionally, the court found that respondent's conduct subsequent to its demand
for arbitration was inconsistent with, and constituted a waiver of, the arbitration agreement.
Klosters Rederi A/S v. Arison Shipping Co., 280 So. 2d 678, 681 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1131 (1974). While respondent's appeal of the denial of the petition to compel arbitration was pending, respondent filed a counterclaim demanding a jury trial. Id. at 680.
166. See text accompanying notes 161-165 supra.
167. Wickes Corp. v. Industrial Financial Corp., 493 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 197I).
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the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Florida law, notedlos that Klosters
Rederi may provide a basis for refusing to compel arbitration when fraud is
9
involved.16
More recently, however, Florida's Second District Court of Appeals refused,
in 1976, to apply Klosters Rederi by distinguishing it factually.' 70 In doing so,
the court illustrated the rather dubious precedential value of Klosters Rederi,
in light of the ease of finding distinctions from the particular facts of the case.
More importantly, however, the court implied that allegations of fraud do not
necessarily avoid an arbitration agreement.1 1
Another decision subsequent to Kiosters Rederi, although not dealing with
the issue of fraud, seemed to depart from the broad rationale of that case. In
Gersh v. Concept House, Inc., 17 2 the Third District Court of Appeal reversed a
lower court order staying arbitration on grounds that the contract was no
longer in force due to abandonment.173 The court stated that the Florida
Arbitration Code174 is "manifestly dear and unambiguous. It divests the circuit
court of jurisdiction to make any determination on the issue of abandonment,
or on any other factual issue other than the making of the agreement or provision."'7 1 The quoted language seems to illustrate a closer adherence to the
statutory scheme of the Florida Arbitration Code than has been evidenced by
the courts of this state in the past.
Besides its easily distinguishable factual setting, the opinion in Klosters
Rederi is further weakened by its failure to establish a sound doctrinal basis
on which lower courts could rely for guidance in determining exactly when
168. The court's notation (see note 169 infra) was merely dicta as the case was decided on
other grounds. More specifically, the court found that the parties had stipulated that the
Florida Arbitration Code not apply. Therefore, the arbitration agreement was interpreted
according to the common law in force in Florida that agreements to arbitrate future disputes
are unenforceable.
169. Id. at 1175 n.4. "A recent Florida case suggests another ground upon which a Florida
court might have refused to require arbitration. In Klosters Rederi v. Arison Shipping Co.
[citation omitted], the court indicated that when third parties are involved or when the
action is founded upon fraud and breach of fiduciary duties, a court of equity may properly
proceed with an adjudication of all rights notwithstanding the existence of a valid binding
arbitration clause. In the present case, Wickes' complaint alleged fraud, breach of contract,
and conversion (emphasis added)."
170. Morton Z. Levine and Associates, Chartered v. Van Deree, 334 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1976). The case was heard on a petition for writ of certiorari after the trial court had
denied defendant's motion to compel arbitration. Despite allegations of misrepresentation and
breach of fiduciary duties, the court noted the lack of complicated issues present in Klosters
Rederi and held that arbitration should be compelled. Id. at 288. The court relied on Watson
v. Chase Chemical Corp., 249 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1971), in which fraud was alleged
and damages sought. That court held that plaintiff was barred from suing on the contract by
the arbitration agreement but that he may have avoided the contract and the included arbitration agreement by suing for rescission. Id. at 54.
171. See note 170 supra. The inference is drawn from the fact that the Morton court
agreed with Watson's holding that in a suit for damages, allegations of fraud do not avoid
an arbitration agreement.
172. 291 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974).
173. Id. at 259.
174. The court cited specifically FLA. STAT. §682.03(4) (1977). 291 So. 2d at 259.
175. 291 So. 2d at 259 (emphasis added).
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fraud is arbitrable. Instead, the Florida supreme court adopted an approach
similar to that taken by the Third District Court of Appeal in Shearson,
Hammill 6- Co. by holding that allegations of fraud combined with additional
76
factors sometimes undercut an otherwise binding arbitration agreement.
Although the issue of arbitrability of fraud has not been well developed in
Florida, it has been hotly debated elsewhere. 7 7 Other courts have provided
more definitive guidelines governing the arbitrability of fraud that should be
considered by the Florida supreme court. Most notably, the United States
Supreme Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Food & Conklin Manufacturing Co.'-,
endorsed the doctrine of separability 179 and held that when an arbitration
clause is broad enough to cover the issue of fraud180 and no claim is made that
the arbitration agreement itself was fraudulently induced, the issue of fraud is
arbitrable.' 8s Since both the federal act and the Florida Arbitration Code provide that the courts can compel arbitration if no issue exists as to the making
of the agreement,8 2 the Supreme Court's rationale appears to be applicable to
Florida law.
The dissent in Prima Paint vigorously opposed the majority's application
of the separability doctrine. 8 3 It stated that "[i]f the contract was procured by
176. See text accompanying notes 112-14 supra.
177. Compare Bernstein, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code Upon Arbitration:
Revolutionary Overthrow or Peaceful Coexistence?, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 8, 17 (1967) with Collins,
Arbitration and the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 736, 745 (1966).
178. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). For a discussion of some procedural problems raised by the case,
see Comment, Federal Arbitration Act and Application of the "Separability Doctrine" in
Federal Courts, 1968 DUKE L. J. 588 (1968).
179. 388 U.S. at 402. Arbitration clauses are separable from the container contract and a
broad clause will be held to encompass the issue of fraudulent inducement of the contract
itself. The Court cited §4 of the United States Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§1-14 (1970)
which provides that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, "[tjhe court shall hear the
parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the
failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties
to proceed to arbitration ..
" 388 U.S. at 403. Note the similar language in the Florida
Arbitration Code: "If the court is satisfied that no substantial issue exists as to the making of
the agreement or provision, it shall grant the application." FLA. STAT. §682.03(1) (1975). The
United States Supreme Court, in Prima Paint, found that the language in the federal act
.'does not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the
contract generally." 388 U.S. at 404.
180. The consulting agreement in issue contained a clause providing for the arbitration
of "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this agreement, or the breach
thereof ..
" 388 U.S. at 398. Such broad clauses are typical in those commercial and industrial contracts containing arbitration clauses. See M. DOMKE, supra note 1, §§5.02-.03, at 37, 39.
181. 388 U.S. at 406.
182. See note 179 supra. It may also be significant that the Florida legislation omits
language contained in the Uniform Arbitration Act that excluded as not arbitrable those
grounds existing at law or in equity for the revocation of the contract. See notes 50-52 supra
and accompanying text. The federal act contains the stipulation recommended by the Uniform
Arbitration Act that an arbitration agreement shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable
"save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9
U.S.C. §2 (1970). Although the majority was not bothered by such language, the dissenting
justices in Prima Paint Corp. cited to this language and added: "Fraud, of course, is one of
the most common grounds for revoking a contract." 388 U.S. at 412 (Black, J., dissenting).
183. 388 U.S. at 407 (Black, J., dissenting). "The separability rule which the Court applies
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fraud, then, unless the defrauded party elects to affirm it, there is absolutely no
contract, nothing to be arbitrated."' 18 4 The dissent, however, failed to deal with
the obvious problem that occurs when a party alleges fraud in order to delay
arbitration by requiring an initial court decision on that issue. 18 5 In Florida,
the effect of such an approach could be even more drastic, since a party might
be able to allege fraud and subsequently have the court decide the other issues
of the case under the Cruger rationale of avoiding piecemeal litigation, 86
thereby avoiding arbitration altogether.
In addition to the breadth and the "separability" of the arbitration clause,
the type of relief sought also is relevant in determining the arbitrability of
fraud. In Watson v. Chase Chemical Corp., a decision rendered prior to

Klosters Rederi, Florida's First District Court of Appeal found that in a breach
of contract suit for damages, allegations of fraud do not relieve a party from a
binding arbitration agreement. 87 However, the court indicated that a suit for
rescission of the entire contract would allow the plaintiff to avoid the agreement.188 The court based its decision implicitly on the rationale that in a
breach of contract suit for damages, the -plaintiffrecognizes the existence of a
contract and alleges the breach thereof, but in a suit for rescission, he challenges the very existence of a valid contract. 18 9
Likewise, the Second District Court of Appeal focused on the type of relief
sought in the recent case of R.B.F. Management Co. v. Sunshine Towers Apartment Residences Association. 90 There, the parties had entered into three management agreements, each including a clause stipulating that any future disputes arising out of the agreements be settled by arbitration.'-9 Disputes arose
to an arbitration clause does not result in equality between it and other clauses in the contract." Id. at 423. For an argument that the separability doctrine is at odds with the concept
of an integrated commercial transaction, see Collins, supra note 177, at 745.
184. 388 U.S. at 412 (Black, J., dissenting).
185. Parsell, Arbitration of Fraud in the Inducement of a Contract, 12 CORNELL L.Q. 351,

359 (1927).
186. See text accompanying note 141 supra.
187. Watson v. Chase Chemical Corp., 249 So. 2d 53, 54 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1971).
188. Id. This distinction has been recognized elsewhere. For example, see Atcas v. Credit
Clearing Corp. of America, 292 Minn. 334, 197 N.W.2d 448 (1972). See also, M. DoMKE, supra
note 1, §8.05.
189. Watson v. Chase Chemical Corp., 249 So. 2d 53, 54 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1971). The court,
2,cited Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 280 F.2d 915 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 911 (1960), which concluded that a damage claim based on fraudulent inducement
does not put in issue the making of a contract and is therefore arbitrable under a broad
arbitration clause. Note that the Florida Arbitration Code specifically provides that if a substantial issue exists as to the making of an agreement, a court should decide the issue and if
it finds that no agreement was made, it shall deny the application for an order to compel
arbitration. FLA. STAT. §682.03(1) (1977). Also note that the United States Supreme Court did
not find the fact that a plaintiff sought rescission of an agreement to be determinative of the
arbitrability of fraud issue. 388 U.S. at 898. However, the dissent argued that unless a defrauded party elects to affirm the contract in question, there is no contract and, therefore,
nothing to be arbitrated. Id. at 412 (Black, J., dissenting). Clearly, by suing for rescission, a
party is not electing to affirm the contract.
190. 352 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977).
191.

Id. at 561.
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concerning performance of the management contracts and the unit owner filed
a complaint seeking termination and rescission of the contracts and appropriate
restitution.192 No damages were sought.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the management
company's motion to compel arbitration, 193 relying on Watson.19' The appellate court recognized the existence of "respectable authority" for the proposition that an arbitration clause is separable from the rest of the contract and is
not rendered invalid by defects in the contract not in the arbitration clause itself.195 However, the court declined to apply the separability doctrine to the
situation confronting it,196 stressing the fact that the plaintiff below had sought
rescission. 197 The court reasoned that rescission, if granted, would leave the
parties with no contract at all and, implicitly, with no arbitration agreement,
and held that the trial court should adjudicate the matter. 198 Since R.B.F.
Management Co. did not involve allegations of fraud, the case indicates that in
the Second District Court of Appeal the type of relief sought, rather than the
grounds on which the action is based, determines whether an arbitration agreement will be enforced. This is a deviation from the First District Court of
Appeal's ruling in Watson that a party may avoid an arbitration agreement by
alleging fraud and seeking rescission. 199 The Florida supreme court only increased the confusion by basing the Klosters Rederi decision to deny arbitration on multifarious grounds,

20 0

and by ignoring the type of relief sought as a

relevant factor.
The only thing that is relatively clear is that the Florida courts are not
willing to adopt the approach taken by the United States Supreme Court in
Prima Paint Corp. that fraud, regardless of the type of relief sought, is not a
ground for avoiding an arbitration agreement. 20' But exactly what is a ground
for avoiding arbitration in Florida is uncertain and in need of clear resolution.
CONCLUSION

The enactment of the Florida Arbitration Code was an admirable effort to
provide a workable alternative to litigation for the resolution of commercial
192. Id. at 562.
193. Id. at 563-64.
194. See text accompanying notes 187-189 supra.
195. R.B.F. Management Co. v. Sunshine Towers Apt. Residences Ass'n, 352 So. 2d 561,
564 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977). It is interesting that the court discusses the separability doctrine
even though the case involved no allegations of fraud. The court defined the doctrine in
broad terms: "[T]he viability of the arbitration clause is separable and must, itself, be
specifically attacked upon some appropriate ground." Id. Whether the doctrine will be expanded to encompass situations not involving fraud remains unclear.

196. Id.
197.

Id. at 563-64. "Appellee did not seek damages." Id. at 563. "Appellee sought rescis-

sion of the entire contract." Id. at 564.
198. Id. at 564. The appellate court did not discuss what steps a trial court should take
subsequent to a denial of rescission.
199. See text accompanying notes 187-189 supra.
200.
201.

See note 165 supra and text accompanying notes 162-163 supra.
See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 398 (1967).
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disputes. However, advantages of speed and economy 20 2 have been diminished
by inconsistent application of the statute by Florida's courts. By obscuring the
clear guidelines established by the legislature, the courts have cast doubt on the
ability of contracting parties to agree in advance to avoid litigation by submitting disputes to arbitration. The rule that a court, once it obtains jurisdiction to render a declaratory decree on the arbitrability of a specific issue, may
decide all other issues as well,203 is particularly harmful to the legislative
scheme. Although the rule has been applied only in uninsured motorist insurance cases thus far, the potential for expanding its applicability to other
situations exists. While such a practice may avoid piecemeal litigation in a
particular case, it also works to allow a contractually bound party to escape his
obligation to arbitrate, thereby encouraging litigation in future cases.
Similarly, there is a need for resolving the question of whether fraud is an
arbitrable issue. Although an affirmative resolution would be preferable,20 4
even a negative answer would add predictability to the reaction of the courts
to an arbitration agreement. However, a necessary corollary to a rule rejecting
fraud as an arbitrable issue is that a court, upon finding that no fraud exists,
must stay the judicial proceeding and compel arbitration in order to prevent
potential future litigants from alleging fraud on inadequate grounds merely to
avoid an arbitration agreement. The effect of seeking rescission, whether or not
accompanied by allegations of fraud, also requires further development.
By allowing parties to escape apparently binding arbitration agreements,
the courts have displayed a skeptical attitude toward the arbitration process.
Although judicial supervision may be desirable in some circumstances, those
situations should be dearly defined. Otherwise, the courts will be encumbered
by litigation initiated by parties seeking to avoid arbitration on unsettled
grounds. Such unnecessary litigation can and should be reduced by resolving
presently existing inconsistencies in the cases dealing with the enforceability of
agreements to arbitrate future disputes.
RicHAR.D M. ZABAK

202. Albritton, supranote 23.
203. Cruger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 So. 2d 690, 694 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1964).
204. See Bernstein, supra note 177, at 17. The author contends that "giving the fraud
issue to the arbitrator seems eminently correct as a matter of policy because the 'fraud' issue
usually involves the same proof as the merits of the alleged breach. To permit a party to
obtain a court hearing and ruling on the issue of fraud in the inducement in effect enables
him to obtain a decision on the merits without resort to the agreed arbitration." Id. at 18-19.
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